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Abstract 
A general hypothesis regarding the impact of permanent income levels and business cycle fluctuations on 
divorce rate at the state level in the United States is analysed in this article. Based on the data for 45 states over 
the sample period of 1978–2009, it is shown that the higher the level of transitory income, the higher the 
incidence of divorce. In other words, divorce is pro-cyclical. 
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I. Introduction 
‘They started to fight when the money got tight, and they just didn't count on the tears...’ Billy Joel ‘Scenes from 
an Italian Restaurant’ 
Do recessions tear married couples apart? Or do they push them closer together? Mather and Lavery 
(2010) noted that marriage rates among young people have been dropping for years, but the decline has 
accelerated since the recession began. Cohen (2010) has also picked up on the idea that the recession ‘… seems 
to be hurrying along a decline in marriage’. A survey conducted in 2008 in London among financial analysts, 
stockbrokers and hedge fund managers suggested that the economic downturn prompted an upsurge in 
divorces among high earners in London's financial centre (Economist, 2008). One explanation is that the 
defecting spouses of high earners are getting out before the economic crunch reduces the potential for lucrative 
settlements. Using county-level data from the state of Washington, Brines and Serafini (2010) showed that rising 
unemployment led to an increase in the number of divorce filings and this effect was most pronounced during 
the 2008 recession. 
On the contrary, another survey result from the United Kingdom showed that as the recession took hold in 
2008, the number of divorces fell to the lowest level since 1975, suggesting that more couples may be staying 
together because the economic crisis left them unable to afford to split (Cassidy, 2010). Unlike the high-income 
earners, the link between divorce rates and economic conditions is less clear-cut for the middle-income earners, 
not least since the main marital assets are houses rather than spouses. Rising inflation and falling house prices 
put pressure on marriages and might thus contribute to higher divorce rates. Still the same factors also make 
splitting up more complicated. Falling property prices mean that selling the family home may not provide 
sufficient funds for two separate homes, especially now that lenders have become much more selective 
(Economist, 2010; Rainer and Smith, 2010). 
Yet some have sounded a contrarian and optimistic view. Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) and Wolfers 
(2010) have suggested that marriage and divorce rates have remained remarkably immune to the ups and 
downs of the business cycle. In 2009, there were about 2.1 million marriages in the United States. Although it 
does represent a slight decline since the Great Recession began, Wolfers (2010) argues that it is the same rate of 
decline that existed during the preceding business cycles and reflects a 30-year trend. Other researchers have 
focused on the response of family arrangements to sudden or severe economic dislocations that may challenge 
norms of household resource allocation or otherwise disrupt long-established patterns of behaviour in marriage 
(Elder, 1974; Westin, 1976; Ware, 1982). Still others point to the enduring resilience of family bonds, and 
suggest that these ties are remarkably adaptive in their ability to absorb social, economic and cultural ‘shocks’. 
These authors maintain that the fragility of marriage in recent years is vastly overstated. 
So which view is correct? Will the recession strengthen or weaken marriage? Two conflicting explanations of this 
relationship have been given in the literature (South, 1985). On the one hand, economic booms make divorce 
more affordable, providing unhappy couples the financial means to end their marriages. So demand for divorce 
would increase as income increases, thus leading to the widely held belief that the number of divorces increases 
during economic expansions and decreases during recessions. On the other hand, deteriorating economic 
conditions, due to say high unemployment, place strains on marital relationship and lead to more divorce (Liker 
and Elder, 1983). According to this view, divorce would increase during economic downturns. 
This article will analyse the impact of business cycle fluctuations on divorce in the United States using state-level 
data. Determining how macroeconomic conditions affect divorce rates is an important component in 
understanding the stability of marriages. Another motivation for this study is that the results would suggest 
important avenues for future research on the determinants of divorce at the individual level. For example, 
researchers and policymakers have long sought to identify factors that contribute to marital instability, 
particularly in at-risk populations. Identifying how macroeconomic conditions affect families will contribute to 
our understanding of how families may or may not cope with business cycles. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section II discusses the trend in marriage and divorce in the United 
States. Section III presents the methodology, while Section IV discusses the data source and estimation results. 
The article ends with a summary and conclusions in Section V. 
II. Trends in Marriage and Divorce 
Fewer couples get divorced in times of economic difficulty, but is that because their marriages are great, or 
because they are too broke to get divorced? ‘The Survey of Marital Generosity’, conducted by the National 
Marriage Project at the University of Virginia in 2011, seems to suggest that both things may occur in times of 
national hardship. Despite previous findings that financial stress tends to weaken marriages, the survey from a 
nationally representative sample of 1197 married Americans aged 18–45 found that 29% of Americans believe 
the most recent recession deepened their commitment to marriage. What is more, 38% of couples who had 
been considering divorce prior to the recession put those plans aside. 
This survey suggests that although there are certainly cases of couples delaying marriage as the result of a job 
loss due to the Great Recession, it is not likely the primary cause for the decline in the percentage of married 
persons between 2008 and 2009. The proportion of people 15 years and over who are married is on the decline 
in the United States and has been for decades, during the times of both economic growth and recessions (see 1–
3 for the trend in divorce rate at both the aggregate and disaggregate level). There are several factors at work 
contributing to this decline. As the percentage of married persons has declined from 67% in 1950 to 54% in 
2009, the percentage of divorced persons has risen. In 2009, more than 23 million or 9.7% of the population was 
divorced compared with just 2.2% in 1950. Last year, 30% of the population 15 years and over had never been 
married compared with 23% in 1950. Both men and women are delaying marriage. In 1970, the median age for 
first marriage was 23 years for men and 21 years for women. Last year, the median age for first marriage had 
risen to 28 years for men and 26 years for women. As these trends suggest, the percentage of the population 
married would likely have declined between 2008 and 2009 even if the economy had been booming. Between 
2005 and 2006 during the height of the last expansion, the percentage of the population that was married 
declined by 0.4%. The percentage of the population that is married has declined or remained unchanged in 12 
out of the past 15 years. 
Fig. 1. Number of divorces/1000 married women aged 15 and older, by year, in the United States 
 
 
Fig. 2. Percentage of all persons aged 15 and older who were divorced, by sex and race, 1960–2010 
 
 
Fig. 3. Historical divorce rate in the United States, 1900–2009 
 
 
In the decade and a half that followed the passing of the no-fault divorce bill in California in 1969, virtually every 
state in the Union followed California's lead and enacted a no-fault divorce law of its own. This legal 
transformation was only one of the more visible signs of the divorce revolution then sweeping the United States: 
from 1960 to 1980, the divorce rate more than doubled – from 9.2 divorces/1000 married women to 22.6 
divorces/1000 married women. In the years since 1980, however, these trends have not continued on straight 
upward paths, and the story of divorce has grown increasingly complicated. In the case of divorce, as in so many 
others, the worst consequences of the social revolution of the 1960s and 1970s are now felt disproportionately 
by the poor and less educated, whereas the wealthy elites who set off these transformations in the first place 
have managed to reclaim somewhat healthier and more stable habits of married life. This imbalance leaves our 
cultural and political elites less well attuned to the magnitude of social dysfunction in much of American society, 
and leaves the most vulnerable Americans – especially children living in poor and working-class communities – 
even worse off than they would otherwise be. 
After rising from 16.4/1000 married women in 2005 to 17.5/1000 married women in 2007, divorce rates in the 
United States fell to 16.9/1000 married women in 2008. This decline in divorce rates suggests that most married 
couples have not responded to the economic crisis following the 2007–09 recession by divorcing. Instead, 
judging by divorce trends, many couple appear to be developing a new appreciation for the economic and social 
support that marriage can provide in tough times. 
III. Methodology 
In this article, we consider a general hypothesis regarding the impact of permanent income levels and business 
cycle fluctuations on divorce rate at the state level. To do so, we follow Melitz and Zumer (2002) and use the 
regression model that they used to examine the regional distribution and stabilization through the central 
government budget. Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) used the same model to analyse the impact of business cycle 
on corruption. 
Consider the following equation:
 
(1) 
DIVORCE𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1INCOME𝑖 + 𝛽2(INCOME𝑖,𝑡 − INCOME𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where DIVORCE i,t , defined as DIVORCE i,t /DIVORCEAVE,t , stands for the relative level of divorce; INCOME i,t is 
GDP i,t /GDPAVE,t , and GDP is per capita gross state product; and ϵ i,t is a disturbance term. Subscripts i and t refer 
to state (i = 1, 2, …, M) and year (t = 1, 2, …, T), and AVE is the average over the sample state. The average of 
INCOME i,t over the entire period, INCOME i, reflects the level of permanent income in state i relative to other 
states in the sample. The deviation, (INCOME i,t – INCOME i ), reflects transitory income. 
Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) have shown that coefficient β1 can exist even when there is no movement in the 
time series, whereas coefficient β2 depends entirely on such movement. This can be shown by 
decomposing Equation 1 into two components: 
(2) 
DIVORCE𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1INCOME𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖  
(3) 
DIVORCE𝑖,𝑡 − DIVORCE𝑖 = 𝛽2(INCOME𝑖,𝑡 − INCOME𝑖) + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 
 
where η i and μ i,t are the two disturbance terms. As η i and μ i,t add up to ϵ i,t , Equations 2 and 3 add up 
to Equation 1. 
The coefficient β1 measures the response to the level of permanent income, whereas the coefficient β2 shows 
the effect of contemporary transitory deviations from the long-run average income level on divorce rate over 
the business cycle. In other words, it shows the cyclical behaviour of divorce. 
Melitz and Zumer (2002) and Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) argue that a distributed-lag version of the equations is 
more appropriate when there is a lagged impact. Accordingly, Equation 3 could be reformulated as 
(4) 
DIVORCE𝑖,𝑡 − DIVORCE𝑖 =∑𝛽2,𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=0
(INCOME𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 − INCOME𝑖) + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡  
where L is the number of lags; ∑ 𝛽2,𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=0  is the cumulative sum of the effect of transitory deviations, and 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 is 
the disturbance term. 
IV. Data Source and Empirical Results 
The measure of divorce used in this study is the refined divorce rate, defined as the number of divorces/1000 
married women aged 15 and older. South (1985) has argued that although the refined divorce rate is insensitive 
to the age composition of the married population, the measure compares favourably with age-specific divorce 
rates and is clearly preferable to two other measures, the crude divorce rate and the ratio of divorces to 
marriages. 
Data on gross state product are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The state-level annual divorce rate 
data are from the vital statistics data series prepared by the National Center for Health Statistics. Updates by 
Justin Wolfers (http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data/DivorceDataAppendix.pdf) are used to update the 
series through 1998. Figures for 1999–2009 are again taken from the National Center for Health 
Statistics: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvss/divorce_rates_90_95_99-09.pdf. 
The sample period runs from 1978 through 2009. Unfortunately, consistent divorce data are not available for all 
states in the United States. The Vital Statistics are missing data for a number of years for California, Hawaii, 
Indiana, Louisiana and New Mexico. These five states are therefore dropped from the analysis. 
As pointed out by Hellerstein and Morrill (2011), this sample period reflects a period where vast changes 
occurred in the divorce rate. As divorces became more common in the late 1970s and early 1980s, cultural 
attitude towards divorce shifted and it carried less of a social stigma (also see Thornton and Young-
DeMarco, 2001). Moreover, as many states adopted the unilateral and no-fault divorce legislation, it became 
easier for one partner alone to initiate a divorce and that partner would not have the same burden of 
establishing fault for grounds of divorce (Friedberg, 1998). Hellerstein and Morrill (2011) also argued that as long 
as one of the possible channels by which macroeconomic conditions affect divorce is through a change in one 
partner's valuation of the quality of the marital match, this channel will be much more relevant in a situation 
where one partner can initiate divorce without establishing fault. Moreover, women were entering the labour 
force in increasing numbers thereby reducing a woman's financial risk in divorcing. 
Equations 2–4 are estimated separately using five regressions. Equation 2 is initially estimated using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and is shown in Column 2 in Table 1. The coefficient of β1 is 0.566 and is statistically 
significant and negative. This implies that permanent income significantly reduces the occurrence of divorce. As 
there is a potential for reciprocal influence and endogeneity, the methodology outlined in Chowdhury (2004) is 
used to estimate Equation 2 using Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). Latitude is used as an instrumental variable 
for per capita state income. The results of the 2SLS are reported in Column 3. The coefficient of β1 is again 
statistically significant and negative with an absolute value of 0.608. Thus the finding from the OLS that an 
increase in permanent income significantly reduces the occurrence of divorce is also supported by the 2SLS 
results. 
Table 1. Regression results: divorce as a function of permanent and transitory incomes 
 Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Independent variable (coefficient) OLS IV (2SLS) OLS GMM-IV GMM-IV 
Constant (𝛽0) 0.391 (0.063) 0.644 (0.000)       
Permanent (𝛽1) income –0.566 (0.013) –0.608 (0.044)       
Transitory (𝛽2) income     0.224 (0.023) 0.189 (0.007) 0.165 
Transitory (𝛽2,𝑡  ) income         0.128 (0.001) 
Transitory (𝛽2,𝑡−1) income         0.095 (0.002) 
Number of observations 45 45 1350 1350 1350 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.70 0.68 0.18     
Degrees of freedom 43 43 1349 82 164 
Notes: GMM, Generalized Method of Moments; GMM-IV, Generalized Method of Moment–Instrumental Variable; OLS, Ordinary Least Squares. p-Values 
are in parentheses. GMM-IV refers to Arellano Bond Bover GMM-IV estimation. 
𝛽2 in Column 5 refers to ∑ 𝛽2,𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=0  in Equation 4.
Next, we estimate the contemporary effect of transitory income on divorce as given in Equation 3. The OLS 
results are given in Column 4 in Table 1. The results show a statistically significant positive relationship between 
divorce and transitory income. The coefficient of β2 is positive and equal to 0.224. Equation 3 is also estimated 
using the Generalized Method of Moment–Instrumental Variable (GMM-IV) technique (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991; Chowdhury, 2004). The results are shown in Column 5. The coefficient of β2 is again statistically 
significant and positive. The coefficient estimate is 0.189. These estimates indicate that divorce practices are 
more pervasive during business booms. 
Finally, we consider the possibility of lagged influence. Equation 4 is estimated using GMM-IV and the estimation 
results are reported in Column 6. The coefficients of β2,t and β2,t-1 are 0.128 and 0.095, respectively. They are 
both statistically significant. The total effect of the transitory deviations, the cumulative sum, ∑ 𝛽2,𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=0  is 
0.223. The positive signs of the coefficients are consistent with both the OLS and the GMM-IV (without lag) 
estimation results. Taken together, the results in Table 1 consistently show that the higher the transitory 
income, the higher the incidence of divorce. In other words, divorce is pro-cyclical. We find strong evidence that 
the divorce rate is pro-cyclical, a result that is consistent with the two other very recent studies examining the 
cyclicality of divorce using vital statistics data (Schaller, 2010; Amato and Beattie, 2011). These results are also 
similar to those reported by Hellerstein and Morrill (2011) but contrary to the results of Wolfers (2010). 
Moreover, the results of Equation 2 show that divorce rates are higher in states with higher income. 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
In this article, we consider a general hypothesis regarding the impact of permanent income levels and business 
cycle fluctuations on divorce rate at the state level in the United States. Using the regression model developed 
by Melitz and Zumer (2002), and data for 45 states over the 1978–2009 sample period, the article shows that 
the higher the level of transitory income, the higher the incidence of divorce. In other words, divorce is pro-
cyclical. 
Why do divorce rates decrease during recession and increase during expansion? As divorce eliminates the gains 
from marriage such as household division of labour (Becker et al., 1997) and the cost sharing of public goods 
(Lam, 1988), it is costly to the couple. So when an economy is in crisis and people's incomes are low, the cost of 
divorce will prevent a couple from divorcing irrespective of the quality of their marriage. In this case, divorce is 
not an effective option for a couple. Extending this reasoning to the Great Recession of 2007–09, it can be 
argued that scarce employment opportunities and reductions in the value of marital assets had forced couples 
to remain together, notwithstanding marital difficulties. Unemployment rates have stubbornly remained close 
to 10%, and the percentage of people working with reduced hours or pay is far in excess of that number. 
Complicating matters is that divorces are often instigated by financial problems. In many divorces, one or both 
of the spouses involved have either lost a job, have their job in jeopardy or had their hours or pay reduced. 
Consequently, many estranged spouses are in a financial bind, when it comes to their divorce, giving a whole 
new meaning to the promise ‘for richer or poorer’. Many couples simply do not have enough money necessary 
to support themselves separately and pay for their other financial obligations. As a result, many couples who 
wanted to separate and divorce had either put their cases on hold and remained together out of economic 
necessity or were looking for more creative and cost-efficient means by which to separate and divorce. 
A second major reason that divorces are being delayed is directly related to the depressed housing market as 
the marital assets are worth significantly less today than they were just a few years ago. In the past, divorcing 
couples often used equity that they built up in their marital residence to fund their divorce and provide each of 
them with a nest egg to begin their separate lives. Home prices in the last few years have dropped significantly, 
however, wiping out much or all of the equity. Worse yet, in many situations, couples need to attempt a short 
sale to separate financially. Anecdotal evidences suggest that in certain cases, moving divorces forward has 
become more difficult because couples do not have the financial means to support themselves separately. 
At the same time, the economic downturn forced many couples to redouble efforts to save their marriages. 
Despite increased marital stress due to the economy, the divorce rate has actually declined since the financial 
collapse – one of many trends supposedly caused by the recession. Why? Perhaps it is just too expensive to split 
up now. 
Or perhaps there is a psychological reason behind the drop in divorce during recessions. When surrounded by 
stories of job loss and foreclosure, couples come to realize what is truly important in life, and their new priorities 
include serious efforts to make marriages work. In other words, the shifts in the broader economic climate have 
led many Americans to deepen their commitment to marriage and, in some cases, to cancel their plans to 
divorce. 
But when a couple decides to postpone divorce due to a recession, it does not usually mean their desire 
ultimately to split is reduced. In fact, studies have shown that couples who experienced unemployment and the 
resulting financial crisis are more likely to experience split up down the road. So, for some couples, recessions 
actually stoke demand for divorce, even as they make it more difficult to achieve. 
Now that sentiment has changed after the recession ended. As the economy moved into a slow and moderate 
recovery beginning in mid-2009, this pent-up demand for divorce was released and the rates increased. That, in 
large part, is why divorce generally follows a ‘pro-cyclical’ course, fluctuating in sympathy with the economy. 
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